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Response letter 
We would like to thank the reviewer for the great comments and suggestions. Our responses 
to the reviewer’s points are outlined below in bold.   
 
This is a revision of a paper that seeks to understand the time and risk preference difference 
(if any) between a mostly-matched pool of patients and physicians in a convenience sample 
of subjects collected from an academic hospital in Athens, Greece.  The reviewers had a 
number of very significant concerns about the first version of the paper - most of which 
have been addressed very well.   
 
I was primarily concerned about two issues: whether the physicians and patients could be 
linked in the analysis (because there could be sorting of patients and doctors in the real 
world such that just looking at average values in preferences might not illuminate whether 
any given patient - physician pairing matched or not) and that there might be differences in 
apparent preferences merely because of the different frames that were being considered 
(patients and physicians were both asked to answer questions considering their own, 
different, health states, for example). 
 
With regard to the first major concern, the authors have responded very well.  They 
conducted sub-analyses on samples that could be matched and they also provided evidence 
that the sort of patient-physician pre-sorting in the real world that could cause bias is 
uncommon.  I'm very satisfied with those responses. 
 
With respect to the second issue - involving whether we can compare measured discount 
rates and risk aversion ratios on populations with different base health and financial states - 
I am mostly satisfied with the response. I have a couple of quibbles with the way that the 
refinements are presented (which are admittedly small and even potentially pedantic, so if 
they get left out of a revision I would not object too strongly). 
 
1.      It's not surprising at all that patients appear risk neutral and physicians appear risk 
averse.  As Rabin and Thaler discuss in their well-known 2001 JEP paper titled "Anomalies - 
Risk Aversion" - unless people at low levels of wealth are nearly risk-neutral then there will 
be absurdly and implausibly high risk aversion for people at higher levels of wealth (though 
they couched that in terms of the gambles people face).  Physicians are generally wealthier 
than their patients. That said, the concern is exactly that it makes it difficult to know what to 
do with the finding that risk tolerances are not the same.  Perhaps physicians know that 
lower-income people are more risk tolerant, and having some idea of their patients' income 
levels, adjust their advice accordingly.  Thus, heterogeneity in preferences defined across 
something that might be reasonably discernable (like wealth) is perhaps not so worrisome.  I 
think that could be mentioned.  
 
*Response to Referee Comments
Response: We have included a paragraph in the manuscript (pages 26 and 27) on different 
ways in which doctors may observe preference heterogeneity and adjust their treatment 
recommendations.  We have also included a statement relating to the fact that the 
doctors are likely to be wealthier than their patients and that this may be the cause of the 
differences in risk preferences in the monetary domain (page 23).    
 
 
2.      My second quibble is that the paper doesn't quite do enough to flesh out for the 
reader what it all means.  If we're going to accept the finding that risk and time preferences 
vary then what does this mean about agency or the quality of care?  As I mention above, 
perhaps physicians can easily (and almost intuitively) compensate for variation in risk 
preferences (depending as they do on difference in wealth), but observable indicators for 
time preferences seem harder to come by.  How can a physician know whether she is facing 
a patient with higher or lower time preferences?   
 
Response: Please see above. We have included a paragraph in the manuscript (pages 26 
and 27) on different ways in which doctors may observe preference heterogeneity and 
adjust their treatment recommendations.   
 
3.      Also, and most importantly, I think the authors have it a bit wrong when they say on 
page 27 that "…doctors, aware that patients are discounting the future more heavily, may 
need to highlight more short-term effects" to get higher adherence to therapy.  This is, I 
think, missing the point.  The physician is supposed to act as a (near) perfect agent for the 
patient.  That means recommending the treatments that the patient would choose given 
the patient's preferences and the physician's knowledge.  So, it's not a matter of tricking the 
patient into adhering to the treatment that the physician chooses given the physician's 
preferences and the physician's knowledge.  No - rather than highlighting short-term 
benefits in a fit of marketing - the physician should rather be recommending different 
treatments that are actually consistent with the patient's shorter-term preferences.  
According to the economic paradigm, it's not for the physician to paternalistically force the 
patient into a treatment the patient would prefer if only the patient had the "right" discount 
rate; the patient's discount rate is normative here.  It's for the physician (and the 
economists thinking about them) to conform to the patient's preferences.  Then, no 
marketing is needed! 
 
I actually think my point 3 is the most important of my outstanding concerns.  It would be 
nice if the manuscript recognized that the whole point is to understand how to better 
improve physician agency and place the discussion in that context, rather than a context of 
how to persuade patients to do something they don't want to do because of their innate 
preferences.  Maybe another paper could tackle what to do when patients are wrong about 
what they want! 
  
Response: We agree with the reviewer and we have reworded this in the conclusion (page 
27).  However, whilst the agent should act according to the patient’s higher rate of time 
preferences, it has also been suggested in the literature that individuals consider their 
heavy discounting of the future to be undesirable and may wish to overcome their 
impatience.  If this is the case, then the question arises whether there is a role for the 
agent (doctor) to help them overcome their impatience for receiving the benefits of 
treatment. This is now mentioned.   
Highlights (3-5 bullet points, max 85 characters each) 
 Doctors and patients do not significantly differ in their risk preferences in 
the health domain. 
 Doctors and patients have significantly different time preferences. 
 Doctors are significantly less impatient than patients. 
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Doctor-patient differences in risk and time preferences: a field experiment 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We conduct a framed field experiment among patients and doctors to test whether the two 
groups have similar risk and time preferences. We elicit risk and time preferences using 
multiple price list tests and their adaptations to the healthcare context. Risk and time 
preferences are compared in terms of switching points in the tests and the structurally 
estimated behavioural parameters. We find that doctors and patients significantly differ in 
their time preferences: doctors discount future outcomes less heavily than patients. We find 
no evidence that doctors and patients systematically differ in their risk preferences in the 
healthcare domain. 
 
Key words: field experiments, risk aversion, impatience, doctor-patient relationship. 
JEL codes: D91, D03, I1, C93. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The doctor-patient interaction is generally modelled as an agency relationship (Iizuka, 
2007; McGuire, 2000; Stavropoulou, 2012). Due to information asymmetry, the doctor acts 
as an agent making decisions on behalf of the patient. In a perfect agency model, doctors’ 
decisions should reflect patients’ preferences. In the case of health decisions patients’ risk 
preferences – the desire for taking a gamble - and time preferences – the degree to which the 
present is valued more than the future - are of particular interest (Gafni and Torrance 1984; 
Dolan and Gudex 1995; van der Pol and Cairns 2008; Bradford 2010; Van Der Pol 2011; 
Bradford et al. 2014; Cairns and Van der Pol 1997; Van Der Pol and Cairns 1999; van der Pol 
and Cairns 2001; van der Pol and Cairns 2002; Gurmankin et al. 2002). The agency 
relationship may not be perfect as doctors cannot easily observe or interpret patients’ 
preferences (Fagerlin et al., 2011; Say and Thomson, 2003; Ubel et al., 2011). If doctors 
make decisions on the basis of their own rather than patients’ preferences, it is important to 
understand whether the two parties have similar preferences for risk and time. 
The importance of risk and time preferences in medical decision-making has been 
extensively discussed in the medical literature. From screening tests (Edwards et al., 2006) 
and general practice (Edwards et al., 2005) to specialist visits for cardiovascular conditions 
(Waldron et al., 2010), almost every doctor-patient consultation involves a discussion of the 
trade-offs between risks and benefits of treatments over time before a treatment decision is 
made (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2004). Evidence suggests that doctors’ risk and time 
preferences affect treatment decisions (Allison et al., 1998; Fiscella et al., 2000; Franks et al., 
2000; Holtgrave et al., 1991); and that patients’ risk and time preferences have an impact on 
the uptake of vaccinations, preventive care, and medical tests (Axon et al., 2009; Bradford, 
2010; Bradford et al., 2010; Chapman and Coups, 1999; Picone et al., 2004) and on treatment 
adherence (Brandt and Dickinson, 2013; Chapman et al., 2001). This means that if doctors 
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 4 
and patients vary in terms of risk and time preferences and doctors cannot readily observe 
these differences, doctors may recommend treatments that are not optimal given patients’ risk 
and time preferences, which may result in lower treatment adherence. Treatment adherence is 
of major concern and has been shown to vary across individuals (WHO, 2003). Some of this 
variation may be due to differences in risk and time preferences between doctors and patients. 
Better matching of doctors to patients may therefore improve health outcomes through better 
treatment allocation and adherence.  
Although the medical literature provides broad evidence on the key role of doctor-
patient communication on healthcare decisions (Bjerrum et al., 2002; Dudley, 2001; Fagerlin 
et al., 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Kipp et al., 2013; Ortendahl and Fries, 2006; Peele et al., 2005), 
there is little evidence on whether patients and their doctors have similar or different risk and 
time preferences. This gap in the evidence is largely due to the lack of primary data that 
directly measure, in a quantitatively comparable way, risk and time preferences across 
patients and doctors.  
Moreover, there is now broad evidence that risk and time preferences are largely 
domain-specific (Attema, 2012; Barseghyan et al., 2011; Blais and Weber, 2006; Bleichrodt 
et al., 1997; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001; Butler et al., 2012; Cairns, 1994; Chapman, 
1996; Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Cubitt and Read, 2007; Einav et al., 2010; Finucane et al., 
2000; Galizzi et al., 2016; Hanoch et al., 2006; Hardisty and Weber, 2009; Hershey and 
Schoemaker, 1980; Jackson et al., 1972; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Prosser and 
Wittenberg, 2007; Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Weber et al., 2002). Even within the same health 
domain, preferences vary across different contexts (Harrison et al. 2005; van der Pol and 
Ruggeri 2008; Butler et al. 2012; Szrek et al. 2012; Bradford et al. 2014). It is possible, 
therefore, that doctors’ and patients’ healthcare decisions are explained not only by their risk 
and time preferences for monetary outcomes, but also (and perhaps more closely) by risk and 
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 5 
time preferences for healthcare outcomes. No secondary data, however, currently exist that 
directly elicit health-related risk and time preferences for patients and doctors (Bradford, 
2010). 
In this article we attempt to fill this gap by explicitly investigating whether patients 
and their matched doctors in natural clinical settings have similar risk and time preferences 
for healthcare outcomes. As a robustness check, we also measure risk and time preferences in 
a closely comparable financial context. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt 
to systematically look at differences and similarities of risk and time preferences across 
doctors and patients in a real healthcare setting.  
We  conduct a ‘framed field experiment’ based on Harrison and List (2004) (an 
‘extra-lab’ experiment according to Charness et al., (2013b)). Field experiments are 
increasingly employed in exploring preferences (Andersen et al., 2014, 2008a, 2008b; 
Charness et al., 2013a; Harrison et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2011), and in comparing them 
across different groups of subjects (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Harrison et al., 2009; Masclet 
et al., 2009). In our field experiment we measure patients’ and doctors’ risk and time 
preferences by adapting the multiple price list (MPL) tests proposed by Holt and Laury 
(2002) and Tanaka et al., (2010), respectively, to the healthcare context (Galizzi et al., 2016). 
In order to address any issue that can potentially arise from framing and domain-specificity in 
preference elicitation, we also measure patients’ and doctors’ risk and time preferences using 
the same MPL tests but in a closely comparable financial context. 
We have three main results. First, there is a significant difference in time preferences 
between patients and their matched doctors, with doctors discounting future health gains and 
financial outcomes less heavily than patients. Second, we find no systematic difference in 
risk preferences in the healthcare domain between patients and doctors: in our sample both 
patients and their matched doctors are mildly, but significantly, risk averse. Third, doctors 
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 6 
and patients have significantly different risk preferences in the finance domain: while doctors 
are risk averse, patients are risk neutral. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description of 
the methods while Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 discuss the main findings in 
the context of the literature, while the last section briefly concludes. 
 
2. METHODS 
2.1. Study Design 
We conducted a field experiment among patients and doctors in a university hospital 
in Athens (Laiko Hospital), Greece, in four waves between September 2010 and November 
2011.
1
 Patients were asked to complete a questionnaire (Online Appendix A1) while they 
were waiting in the outpatients’ clinics to see their doctors.  The questionnaire was completed 
in the presence of a research assistant who explained the questions and was available for 
assistance during the completion of the questionnaire.  The patients’ doctors were also invited 
to take part in the study by completing a similar questionnaire. The outpatient clinics were 
pathology, cardiology, gynaecology, haematology, surgery, endocrinology, orthopaedics, 
urology, gastroenterology, nephrology, rheumatology, ophthalmology, and otolaryngology. 
Patients who attend the outpatient clinics are seen by the first available doctor. They are 
therefore randomly assigned to their doctors. We obtained questionnaire data for 300 patients 
and 67 doctors. Not all patients could be matched to the doctor they saw for two reasons. 
First, patients did not know beforehand which doctor they would see, and some patients 
refused to answer further questions when leaving the clinic. Second, some doctors did not 
                                                 
1
 Round 1 of data collection started in September 2010, lasted 5 weeks and included 91 patients. Round 2 started 
in January 2011, lasted 4 weeks and included 34 patients. Round 3 started in April 2011, lasted 5 weeks and 
included 56 patients. Round 4 started in October 2011, lasted 4 weeks and included 119 patients. It should be 
noted that the survey was conducted at a time of great economic crisis. The potential implications are discussed 
in detail in Galizzi et al. (2016).  
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 7 
complete the questionnaire. A total of 144 patients (48% of patients) could be matched to 
their doctors.   
The study was approved by the hospital’s Research Ethics Board on 6th of August 
2010 (protocol number ES 462).  
 
2.2. Questionnaire and Variables 
The questionnaire included a number of socio-demographic questions, such as the 
respondents’ age (Age), gender (Female), marital status (Married), education level (Educ), 
perception of their current financial situation (FinConstr), and whether they have children or 
not (Children). Patients were also asked about their health status, both by reporting their self-
assessed health (SAH) and whether or not they had a chronic condition (Chronic). A full 
description of the variables in the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Risk Preferences 
Risk preferences were measured using an adaptation of the Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test 
to the healthcare context (Galizzi et al., 2016). The MPL method is one of the most widely 
used incentive-compatible tests in experimental economics to measure risk preferences for 
monetary outcomes (Charness et al., 2013a). Subjects are presented with a series of choices 
between two lotteries (A and B). The payoffs in the lotteries remain constant but the 
probability associated with each payoff changes. Lottery A is associated with a higher 
expected pay-off in the first few choices but this switches to lottery B in the later choices.  
 
Table 1: Adaptation of the Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test to measure risk preferences in the 
healthcare domain. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your Choice 
 P Days 
in full 
P Days 
in full 
P Days 
in full 
P Days in 
full 
A B 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 8 
health health health health 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
The MPL was adapted by presenting the lotteries as different healthcare treatments 
with payoffs defined as days of full health (Table 1). A risk-neutral individual should switch 
from the ‘safe’ option (treatment A) to the ‘risky’ option (treatment B) only when the 
expected utility is greater in treatment B than in A. An individual who is risk neutral chooses 
treatment A in rows 1-4, before switching to B in row 5. A risk averse individual switches to 
treatment B after row 5, while a risk lover switches before row 5. Thus, the switching point is 
a measure of an individual’s risk preferences. We define SwitchRiskHP (SwitchRiskHD) a 
variable denoting the point at which a given patient (doctor) switched from lottery A to 
lottery B. This ranges from 1 (switching to treatment B in the first row) to 10 (never 
switching to treatment B) and the higher the value, the more risk averse the patient (doctor) 
is. 
 
Time preferences 
Time preferences were measured using an adaptation of the Tanaka et al. (2010) MPL 
to the healthcare context. Subjects were presented with a series of six blocks of choices, each 
of which had five choices between two different healthcare treatments. Subjects were asked 
to consider their current health status and to choose between two possible hypothetical 
treatments, A and B, with different days of full health at different points in time (Table 2). In 
each block, treatment A gave a larger number of days in full health than treatment B. 
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 9 
Treatment A, however, was offered with some delay (so-called Larger-Later option, LL) 
while treatment B was always available immediately (so-called Smaller-Sooner option, SS). 
Treatment B offered progressively a larger number of days in full health. The time delay 
varied between blocks of lotteries from 1 week (blocks 1 and 4) to 1 month (blocks 2 and 5), 
to 3 months (blocks 3 and 6).  We used switching points as simple measures of individual 
time preferences. The later individuals switch from treatment A to treatment B the more 
patient they are.  The variable SwitchTimeHPBi (SwitchTimeHDBi) denote the specific point 
at which a given patient (doctor) switched from option A to option B in the block of 
questions i. The values range from 1 to 6 and the higher the value, the more patient the 
subject is. 
 
Table 2: Adaptation of the Tanaka et al (2010) test to measure time preferences in the healthcare 
domain. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your 
choice 
1.1  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 60 days in full health starting today A B 
1.2  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 120 days in full health starting today A B 
1.3  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 180 days in full health starting today A B 
1.4  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 240 days in full health starting today A B 
1.5  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 300 days in full health starting today A B 
2.1  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 60 days in full health starting today A B 
2.2  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 120 days in full health starting today A B 
2.3  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 180 days in full health starting today A B 
2.4  360 days in full health starting  in 1 month 240 days in full health starting today A B 
2.5  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 300 days in full health starting today A B 
3.1  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 60 days in full health starting today A B 
3.2  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 120 days in full health starting today A B 
3.3  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 180 days in full health starting today A B 
3.4  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 240 days in full health starting today A B 
3.5  360 days in full health starting in 3 months 300 days in full health starting today A B 
4.1  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 150 days in full health starting today A B 
4.2  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 300 days in full health starting today A B 
4.3  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 450 days in full health starting today A B 
4.4  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 600 days in full health starting today A B 
4.5  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 750 days in full health starting today A B 
5.1  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 150 days in full health starting today A B 
5.2  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 300 days in full health starting today A B 
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5.3  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 450 days in full starting health today A B 
5.4  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 600 days in full health starting today A B 
5.5  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 750 days in full health starting today A B 
6.1  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 150 days in full health starting today A B 
6.2  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 300 days in full health starting today A B 
6.3  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 450 days in full health starting today A B 
6.4  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 600 days in full health starting today A B 
6.5  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 750 days in full health starting today A B 
 
 
 
2.3. Analysis 
We examine differences in risk and time preferences between patients and doctors 
using two measures for individual preferences. First, we examine switching points in the 
MPL tests as indicators of individual risk and time preferences. The higher the value of the 
SwitchRiskHP (SwitchRiskHD) variable, the more risk averse in healthcare a patient (doctor) 
is. Similarly, the higher the value of the SwitchTimeHPBi (SwitchTimeHDBi) variable the 
more patient in healthcare a patient (doctor) is. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality rejects 
the null hypothesis that the switching points are normally distributed and we therefore test for 
differences in means between patients and doctors using the non-parametric (Wilcoxon) 
Mann-Whitney test. Even though doctors and patients may on average differ in their time and 
risk preferences, it could be the case that there is no difference in preferences in matched 
doctor-patient pairs and vice versa. It is therefore important to examine the difference in 
matched pairs as well as the difference in overall mean between doctors and patients. This is 
done by examining the number of patients who have identical or similar switching points to 
their doctors. We test for differences in switching points in matched pairs using the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test.  As mentioned previously, 48% of patients can be matched 
to their doctor. Statistical tests (chi-square and t-tests) show that this sub-sample is similar to 
the whole sample in terms of socio-demographic characteristics.  
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Second, we ‘structurally’ estimate the behavioural parameters within the utility 
functions. We separately estimate risk and time preferences following the empirical 
approaches by Harrison and Rutström (2008), Andersen et al. (2010), and Tanaka et al. 
(2010).  We assume that the health-related risk preferences can be represented by a constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. The utility function of a subject in terms of 
healthcare payoffs x, is thus represented by 
     
    
   
         (1) 
where s is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion in the healthcare context. 
Depending on the value of s a subject shows different degrees of risk aversion in the 
healthcare domain that can be grouped in three main types: 
1. if s=0 risk neutral 
2. if s>0 risk averse 
3. if s<0 risk seeking 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods were used to empirically estimate risk 
preferences (Harrison and Rutström (2008) and Andersen et al. (2010)). From equation (1) 
U(x) is the utility that a subject perceives from getting a healthcare benefit x. Under Expected 
Utility Theory, the expected utility by a subject of a given lottery j=A,B is the utility of each 
outcome k=1,2 in that lottery, weighted by the probability pk of the outcome: 
EUj = ∑k=1,2  pkj * U (xkj)          (2) 
with j=A,B and k=1,2. The expected utility depends on the subject’s risk aversion parameter 
s. Based on a candidate value of s a latent preference index Δ(EU) can be constructed. Our 
empirical model allows subjects in the outpatient clinics to make stochastic errors when 
comparing expected utilities. We include in our estimation a parameter μ to capture the 
stochastic error, so that the latent index is:  
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                               (3) 
When μ→0 the stochastic errors become negligible and the empirical specification reduces to 
a deterministic EUT choice, where the subject always chooses the lottery with higher 
perceived expected utility.  When, however, μ gets larger, μ→±∞, the choice between the two 
lotteries becomes essentially random, with the value of the latent index function approaching 
½ for any values of the expected utilities.  We assume that the latent index Δ(EU) follows a 
logistic cumulative density function (CDF) taking values between 0 and 1, so that Λ(Δ(EU)) 
can be thought to link the latent preferences and the binary choices observed in the 
experiment (1): 
Prob (choosing lottery A) = Λ(Δ(EU))            (4) 
Under the assumptions of Expected Utility Theory and of CRRA utility functions, the 
likelihood of observing a specific choice depends on the individual risk preference s, given 
the logistic CDF linking the latent index to the observed choices. The individual log-
likelihood of choosing either lottery in each of the observed choices Ci, in our experiment is 
given by:  
Ln L (s, μ; C) = ∑i ((ln Λ(Δ(EU))| Ci =1 ) + ((ln Λ(1 – Δ (EU))| Ci =0 )              (5) 
where Ci =1(0) denotes the choice of lottery A(B) in the proposed pair of lotteries i.  The ML 
was adjusted to allow the CRRA parameter s to be a linear function s = s0 + s1 D where D is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 for doctors and 0 for patients. 
For time preferences we follow the procedure by Tanaka et al. (2010) to estimate the 
shape of the discounting function for patients and doctors. Tanaka et al. (2010) use a general 
discounting model originally proposed by Benhabib et al. (2010) which allows to test 
exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting as ‘nested’ cases of a more general 
discounting function. The discounting model assigns to a healthcare benefit y at time t>0 a 
value of  
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                                          (6) 
(and a value y for immediate healthcare benefit at t=0). The three factors r,  , and   identify 
the levels of baseline time discounting (r), present bias ( ), and hyperbolicity of the 
discounting function ( ), respectively. 
This general discounting model nests the three most common discounting 
specifications as special cases. In particular, when     as     the discounted value 
reduces to the conventional exponential discounting model in the limit,      (Samuelson, 
1947; Koopmans, 1960). When     as     the discounted value reduced to the ‘pure 
hyperbolic’ discounting model,  
 
    
  (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).2 When, finally,     
and   is a free parameter, then the discounted value reduces to the ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ or 
‘present bias’ discounting model       (Laibson, 1997; Phelps and Pollak, 1968).  
We denote the probability of choosing immediate reward of x over the delayed reward 
of y in t days by            and use a logistic function to describe this relationship (7): 
           
 
                                
    (7) 
where         are the above defined parameters, and   is a response sensitivity or ‘noise’ 
parameter.  
A dummy variable for doctors is included in the models to examine whether 
parameters vary across doctors and patients. For example, for the ‘present bias’ model, we fit 
a logistic function (8) 
           
 
                    
     (8) 
                                                 
2
 The ‘hyperbolic’ model originally proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) actually takes the more general 
form   where the parameter h can be interpreted as a measure of ‘decreasing impatience’ (Attema et al., 2010; 
Bleichrodt et al., 2014; Prelec, 2004; Rohde, 2010). When h=0, the hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to 
exponential discounting. The higher is h, the more individual discounting deviates from constant discounting. 
The Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) general hyperbolic model nests further specific models such as the ‘power’ 
discounting model when h=1 (Harvey, 1995, 1986), and the ‘proportional’ discounting model when h=r 
(Mazur, 1987), which is the ‘pure hyperbolic’ specification fitted in our estimations. 
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Where         ,         , and D is a dummy variable taking value 1 for doctors 
and 0 for patients. 
All estimates were obtained using an iterative nonlinear least square regression 
procedure with standard errors clustered at individual level, and a minimum number of 100 
iterations at 99 percent significance level. When initial values had to be specified in order to 
help convergence of estimations, multiple replications were performed using a range of 
different initial values.  
 
Robustness checks and further analysis 
Both the time and risk preference tasks were conducted from the perspective of the 
subject’s current health status. This raises two issues. First, the size of the health gain from 
the treatment varies across subjects depending on the level of their current health. The health 
gain is likely to be larger on average for patients compared to their doctors. Earlier empirical 
evidence suggests that individuals tend to be more risk averse for larger gains although this is 
now being debated (Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2005, 2002). If true, this may bias 
the results towards patients being more risk averse. The time preference literature suggests 
that individuals discount larger gains at a lower rate than smaller gains (Andersen et al., 
2013; Benzion et al., 1989; Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Green et al., 1997; Kirby and 
MarakoviĆ, 1996; Scholten and Read, 2010; Thaler, 1981). This may bias the results towards 
patients being more patient. To explore this we examine whether switching points are a 
function of self-assessed health using both a chi-square test and a Pearson correlation 
coefficient. The estimated difference between doctors and patients is less likely to be biased 
by differences in health gains if there is no statistically significant relationship between self-
assessed health and switching point. If there is a significant relationship the sign of the 
correlation will indicate the direction in which the results may be biased.   
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Secondly, the use of current health state raises the issue of satiation in subjects who 
are in full health. Individuals may express indifference (zero time preference and risk 
neutrality) in that case or not engage with the tasks. We explore this by replicating the 
analysis excluding subjects who reported to be in full health.   
To further test the robustness of our results, we also compare time and risk 
preferences between patients and doctors in the finance domain using the Tanaka et al. (2010) 
MPL test and the Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test (Online Appendix A2). In the financial 
domain, the size of the gain is the same across all subjects and none of the subjects will be 
satiated. Whilst time and risk preferences have been shown to be domain specific (Attema, 
2012; Barseghyan et al., 2011; Blais and Weber, 2006; Bleichrodt et al., 1997; Bleichrodt and 
Johannesson, 2001; Butler et al., 2012; Cairns, 1994; Chapman, 1996; Chapman and Elstein, 
1995; Cubitt and Read, 2007; Einav et al., 2010; Finucane et al., 2000; Galizzi et al., 2016; 
Hanoch et al., 2006; Hardisty and Weber, 2009; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Jackson et 
al., 1972; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Prosser and Wittenberg, 2007; Viscusi and 
Evans, 1990; Weber et al., 2002), it could be argued that, if the domain effect is similar 
across patients and doctors, then the difference in preferences between doctors and patients 
should be similar across domains. Similar differences across the two domains would increase 
the confidence we can place on the healthcare results.   
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Summary Statistics  
The summary statistics for the two samples of patients and doctors are reported in Table 3.  
Due to missing values the sample size for estimating time and risk preferences varies from 
241 to 294 for patients and from 56 to 66 for doctors.  The four patients who switched back in 
the time preference tasks were omitted from the analysis.   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
  Patients Doctors 
SwitchHRisk 281 5.06 2.57 0 10 58 5.03 2.05 1 10 
SwitchHTimeB1 273 4.39 1.93 1 6 63 4.88 1.69 1 6 
 SwitchHTimeB2 265 3.35 2.03 1 6 60 4.2 1.93 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB3 252 2.68 2.02 1 6 61 3.52 1.98 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB4 248 4.63 1.89 1 6 60 4.8 1.91 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB5 242 3.41 2.01 1 6 56 4.12 2.15 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB6 241 2.81 2.03 1 6 56 3.8 2.14 1 6 
SwitchFRisk 294 4.90 2.75 1 10 59 5.52 2.36 1 10 
SwitchFTimeB1 294 4.12 1.98 1 6 66 4.77 1.65 1 6 
 SwitchFTimeB2 293 3.05 1.88 1 6 65 4.36 1.62 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB3 292 2.43 1.77 1 6 66 3.64 1.77 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB4 291 4.67 1.87 1 6 65 5.14 1.39 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB5 290 3.71 1.97 1 6 66 4.44 1.63 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB6 289 2.69 1.83 1 6 66 3.57 1.81 1 6 
Age  238 39.61 12.93 18 74 61 36.59 8 27 63 
Female 300 0.48 0.50 0 1 67 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Educ 238 5.59 1.63 2 8                                   
Married 300 0.34 0.47 0 1 67 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Children 300 0.34 0.47 0 1 67 0.23 0.43 0 1 
FinConstr 232 2.45 0.74 1 4 60 2.03 0.66 1 3 
SAH 300 2.39 1.16 1 5 67 1.62 0.73 1 4 
Chronic 300 0.17 0.37 0 1      
 
The statistics show that, with the exceptions of income (and education) levels, age, 
and self-assessed health, doctors and patients in our sample have comparable socio-
demographic characteristics. 
 
3.2. Switching points measures for risk and time preferences: differences between 
patients and doctors 
We start by examining differences in risk preferences. The mean switching point in 
the healthcare domain was SwitchHRiskP=5.06 (SD=2.57) for patients and 
SwitchHRiskD=5.03 (SD=2.05) for doctors. The Mann-Whitney test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that SwitchHRiskP=SwitchHRiskD (z=-0.332, p=0.7401), suggesting that health-
related risk preferences are similar for doctors and patients.  
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The lack of significance of the chi-square test and the Pearson correlation (p=0.433 
and p=0.0875 respectively) suggest that there is no significant relationship between risk 
preferences and self-assessed health. The potential difference in the size of the health gain 
between doctors and patients is therefore unlikely to have biased the comparison. To further 
test the robustness of the results we also compare risk preferences in the financial domain.  
The mean switching point in the finance domain was SwitchFRiskP=4.90 (SD=2.75) for 
patients, while for the doctors it was SwitchFRiskD=5.52 (SD=2.36). The Mann-Whitney 
rejects the null hypothesis that SwitchFRiskP=SwitchFRiskD at a 95% significance level (z=-
1.973, p=0.0485), suggesting a significant difference in the finance-related risk preferences 
between the two groups, with the doctors being more risk averse in finance than patients.  
In case of time preferences, a relatively large proportion of doctors and patients never 
switched from option A to option B, with the exact proportion varying per block of questions.  
In the healthcare domain the percentage of respondents never switching were 50% in the first 
block, 28% in the second, 19% in the third, 57% in the fourth block, 32% in the fifth and 
25% in sixth block. Similar figures hold for the finance domain. 
Table 4 shows that in the healthcare the mean switching points for doctors are higher 
across all six blocks of pairwise choices, and the doctor-patient differences are significant in 
all cases but the fourth block. Note that the doctor-patient differences are only marginally 
significant in the first block. This suggests that doctors are more patient when discounting 
future health outcomes than patients, at least for time delays longer than a week. The 
significance of the chi-square test and the Pearson correlation suggest that there is a 
significant relationship between time preferences and self-assessed health (p-values for chi-
square test range from 0.0001 to 0.1001 across the six blocks, and the p-values for the 
Pearson correlation range from 0.0000 to 0.0001). The correlation is negative suggesting that 
larger health gains (lower self-assessed health) are discounted at a higher rate. The difference 
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in time preferences may therefore be caused by the difference in current health status between 
doctors and patients. To explore this further we also compare time preferences in the 
financial domain. Table 4 shows that the results for time preferences for money are very 
similar in that doctors are significantly more patient than their patients.   
 
Table 4: Differences in time preferences between doctors and patients 
 TimeB1 TimeB2 TimeB3 TimeB4  TimeB5 TimeB6 
Healthcare        
Number of patients 273 265 252 248 242 241 
Number of doctors 63 60 61 60 56 56 
Switching point mean patients 4.39 3.35 2.68 4.63 3.41 2.81 
Switching point mean doctors 4.88 4.2 3.52 4.8 4.1 3.80 
z statistic -1.911 -2.770 -2.940 -0.899 -2.249 -2.937 
p-value  0.0560 0.0056 0.0033 0.3685 0.0245 0.0033 
Finance        
Number of patients 294 293 292 291 290 289 
Number of doctors 66 65 66 65 66 66 
Switching point mean patients 4.12 3.06 2.43 4.67 3.71 2.69 
Switching point mean doctors 4.77 4.35 3.64 5.14 4.44 3.57 
z statistic -2.343 -4.941 -4.985 -1.457 -2.555 -3.558 
p-value  0.0191 0.0000 0.0000 0.1451 0.0106 0.0004 
Note: P-values refer to tests of the null hypothesis that switching points are not statistically significantly 
different across patients and doctors. 
 
Table 5 shows the difference in switching points between matched doctor-patient 
pairs. The proportion of patients who have identical time and risk preferences to their doctor 
ranges from 19.5% for risk preferences to 38.9% for time preferences (fourth block). 
Switching points are 2 or more apart from their doctors for around 50% of patients. The 
results of the Wilcoxon matched pairs test are in line with the results for the aggregate 
preferences. There are no differences in risk preferences but matched doctor-patients do 
differ in terms of their time preferences. That the results are similar is perhaps not surprising 
given that patients in our outpatient clinics were randomly assigned to a doctor.    
 
Table 5. Difference in switching point in matched doctor-patient pairs 
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 No difference Difference of 1 
point 
Difference of more 
than 1 point 
Wilcoxon 
matched pairs 
test 
 N % N % N % p-value 
SwitchHRisk 24 19.5 31 25.2 68 55.3 0.1074 
SwitchHTimeB1 43 33.6 17 13.3 68 53.1 0.0002 
SwitchHTimeB2 32 27.4 21 17.9 64 54.7 0.0000 
SwitchHTimeB3 38 35.2 14 13.0 56 51.9 0.0000 
SwitchHTimeB4 42 38.9 8 7.4 58 53.7 0.0036 
SwitchHTimeB5 34 34.3 13 13.1 52 52.5 0.0125 
SwitchHTimeB6 34 35.4 12 12.5 50 52.1 0.0000 
 
3.3. Structural estimation of risk and time preferences: differences between patients and 
doctors 
Table 6 shows the ML results which allow the fitted parameters to be a function of a 
doctor dummy variable, in order to estimate differences across the two types of respondents. 
The estimates for the two subsamples of doctors and patients are reported in Appendix B and 
are in line with the pooled results. The table also shows that the doctor dummy variable is not 
statistically significant in the estimates for the CRRA parameter in the healthcare domain, 
confirming that there are no systematic differences in risk preferences for healthcare 
outcomes across doctors and patients. The doctor dummy variable is also not significant in 
the estimates for the stochastic error μ, suggesting that doctors and patients are equally likely 
to make errors in their responses to the test. In the finance domain, the doctors’ dummy 
variable is significantly associated with both the CRRA and the noise coefficient: doctors are 
more risk averse in finance than patients, and also make less errors in their choices compared 
to patients.  
 
 
Table 6. Estimated risk aversion parameters under CRRA 
  Healthcare domain Finance domain 
     
s  0.1415*** 0.1211** 0.0432 -0.0135 
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 (0.0470) (0.0522) (0.0535) (0.0578) 
s
d
 -0.0138 0.0872 0.0253 0.3352*** 
 (0.0322) (0.1092) (0.0315) (0.1173) 
     
Μ 30.8911*** 34.5442*** 52.3180*** 71.8444*** 
 (6.6939) (8.5517) (13.4195) (20.7522) 
μd  -14.8975  -59.5904*** 
  (12.0268)  (21.5227) 
Observations 3,051 3,051 3,177 3,177 
Log pseudo LL -1721.87 -1719.70 -1771.23 -1756.73 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Sample size in the healthcare domain is 3,051: 9 observations for 281 
patients and 58 doctors. Sample size in the financial domain is 3,177: 9 observations for 294 patients and 59 
doctors. 
 
As for time preferences, due to the relatively small number of observations for the doctors, 
we were unable to reliably fit the general discounting model. We therefore focus on the 
estimation of the three ‘nested’ discounting models: i) the ‘exponential’ model; ii) the ‘pure’ 
hyperbolic discounting model; and iii) the ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ or ‘present bias’ model.    Table 
7 shows the results for the three different discounting models.
3
  In the healthcare domain, the 
estimated coefficient for the doctor dummy variable is negative and highly significant in both 
the ‘exponential’ and the ‘pure hyperbolic’ model (-0.015, with SE=0.0036, and -0.0248 with 
SE=0.0064, respectively), suggesting that doctors are less impatient than patients. The 
estimated coefficient for the doctor dummy variable is also negative and highly significant in 
the finance domain (-0.0135, with SE=0.0025, in the ‘exponential’ model, and -0.0237, with 
SE=0.0047, in the ‘pure hyperbolic’ model).  In the ‘present bias’ model, the doctor dummy 
variable is negative and highly significant for the long-run discounting rates (-0.0159, with 
                                                 
3
 Sample size in Table 7 differs across the healthcare and the finance domains due to different missing data in 
the different blocks of time preferences questions. In the healthcare domain, 273 patients and 63 doctors 
answered the first block of questions; 265 patients and 60 doctors answered the second block of questions; 252 
patients and 61 doctors answered the third block of questions; 248 patients and 60 doctors answered the fourth 
block of questions; 242 patients and 56 doctors answered the fifth block of questions; and 241 patients and 56 
doctors answered the last block of questions. Since each block had five time preferences questions, this gives a 
total of 9,385 responses in the healthcare domain. Similarly, in the financial domain, 294 patients and 66 doctors 
answered the first block of questions; 293 patients and 65 doctors answered the second block of questions; 292 
patients and 66 doctors answered the third block of questions; 291 patients and 65 doctors answered the fourth 
block of questions; 290 patients and 66 doctors answered the fifth block of questions; and 289 patients and 66 
doctors answered the last block of questions. This gives a total of 10,715 responses in the finance domain. 
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SE=0.0034, in the healthcare domain; and -0.0096, with SE=0.0020, in the finance domain), 
but does not reach statistical significance for the present bias parameter (0.0144, with 
SE=0.1126, in the healthcare domain, and 0.1033, with SE=0.0813, in the finance domain). 
Estimates also confirm that doctors are generally less impatient than patients, and that, the 
present bias parameter is not significantly different from one. 
The goodness of fit of the estimated discounting models is relatively high with the 
adjusted R
2 
ranging from 0.5243 to 0.5301 in the healthcare domain, and from 0.5690 to 
0.5706 in the finance domain. The goodness of fit does not vary substantially across the 
different specifications within the same domain.  
 
Table 7. Estimated discounting parameters under exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting models 
 Healthcare domain Finance domain 
  Exponential Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic Exponential Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic 
μ  0.0037*** 0.0042*** 0.0035*** 0.0045*** 0.0051*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
R 0.0215*** 0.0338*** 0.0231*** 0.0208*** 0.0339*** 0.0171*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0055) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.004) (0.0017) 
B   1.0404***   0.8997*** 
   (0.0611)   (0.0813) 
r
d
 -0.015*** -0.0248** -0.0159*** -0.0135*** -0.0237*** -0.0096*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0020) 
b
d
   0.0144   0.1033 
   (0.1126)   (0.0813) 
Observations 9,385 9,385 9,385 10,715 10,715 10,715 
Adj R-Squared 0.5300 0.5243 0.5301 0.5690 0.5706 0.5697 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Sample size differs across the healthcare and the finance domains due to 
different missing data in the different blocks of the time preferences questions. See footnote 4 for a detailed 
explanation.  
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The above estimates of the risk and time preferences parameters and of the doctor-
patient dummy are robust to the introduction in the models of further covariates, such as 
gender, age, financial state, and self-assessed health. Finally, similar results were found when 
excluding subjects who reported to be in full health suggesting that satiation might not have 
been an issue (results available upon request). 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
Our data suggests that there is no systematic difference in risk preferences in the 
healthcare domain between doctors and patients: both doctors and patients tend to be mildly 
risk averse in the healthcare domain. It could be argued that the lack of significant doctor-
patient differences in risk preferences in health is not due to a genuine similarity of the 
underlying risk preferences, but is partly an artefact of the differences in perceived health 
gains with doctors closer to being ‘satiated’ in health than patients.4 On average, doctors’ 
self-reported health was higher than patients (1.62 compared to 2.39). However, we found no 
significant relationship between risk preferences and self-assessed health. This is in line with 
other studies which have questioned the earlier evidence that individuals tend to be more risk 
averse for larger (monetary) outcomes (Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2005, 2002). If 
the earlier evidence holds, this would imply that doctors would be more risk averse if 
presented with larger health gains. Therefore, the non-significant small difference in risk 
                                                 
4
 Note that we have opted for having the same framing across patients and doctors in order to not confound the 
findings with differences in the framing. An alternative experiment design could consist of presenting both 
doctors and patients with the same baseline hypothetical health status scenario. Given the non-observable 
differences in health status across patients, however, it would not be possible to elicit which health status 
(whether their own status or the hypothetical baseline status) was more salient in patients’ choices. It is plausible 
to presume that the most salient would be the most severe health status, implying that a patient with a cancer 
diagnosis would anchor her choices to her real health status, whereas a doctor in full health would be more 
likely to anchor his choices to the hypothetical baseline scenario.   
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aversion in healthcare between patients and doctors found in our estimations may have 
resulted from an underestimation of risk aversion in doctors.   
The use of current health state as the reference point also raises the question as to how 
subjects in good health answered the questions as they were ‘satiated’ in their level of health. 
Around half of the doctors (51.25%) reported to be in very good health. However, excluding 
subjects who reported to be in very good health did not change the results. Given that all 
subjects gave reasonable and meaningful answers all throughout the tests, and that the 
estimates of the CRRA coefficient are consistent with non-satiation (e.g. Harrison and 
Rutstrom, 2008b, p.181), it may be the case that subjects who reported being in very good 
health used a reference health status worse than the self-reported health at the time they 
participated in the experiment. That is, subjects may have made sense of the scenario 
presented in a way more consistent with the life-time health losses they experienced or 
expected to experience. Therefore it is possible that their answers were implicitly anchored to 
a poorer health status than their reported self-assessed health.  
We also compared risk preferences across doctors and patients in the financial domain 
as a further robustness check. In the financial domain, the size of the gain was the same 
across all subjects and none of the subjects were satiated.  However, it should be noted that 
doctors in our sample are generally on higher incomes than their patients, and income is 
known to be associated with risk preferences (Donkers et al., 2001). Doctors and patients did 
significantly differ in their risk preferences in the finance domain, with doctors being risk 
averse whilst patients are risk neutral. Moreover, the estimated CRRA coefficient for doctors 
in finance is higher than their CRRA coefficient in health (Appendix B), suggesting that the 
differences in risk preferences across doctors and patients may have been underestimated in 
the healthcare domain. An alternative explanation for the difference in risk preferences in the 
monetary domain is the difference in income levels.   
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In case of time preferences, our evidence suggests that doctors are more patient than 
their patients when deciding over healthcare treatments with benefits at different points in 
time. We do not find any support for present bias either in patients’ or in doctors’ time 
preferences for healthcare treatments. The above results are confirmed for the financial 
domain. We found a significant relationship between time preferences and self-assessed 
health with larger health gains being discounted at a higher rate. The difference in time 
preferences between doctors and patients may have therefore in part been caused by 
differences in the size of the health gain. However, we found a similar difference in time 
preferences between doctors and patients across the two domains.  
For the health domain, the lack of present bias is in line with other recent studies 
which, using different methods, also reject the quasi-hyperbolic model for time preferences in 
health (Bleichrodt et al., 2014), but it is in contrast with earlier evidence on quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting for health outcomes (Cairns and Van der Pol 1997; van der Pol and Cairns 2002).  
For the finance domain, our findings may seem unexpected given the widespread support in 
favour of quasi-hyperbolic discounting among behavioural economists (Ainslie, 1975; 
Angeletos et al., 2001; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Diamond and Köszegi, 2003; 
Gruber and Köszegi, 2004, 2001; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby and Maraković, 1995; Laibson, 
1997; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; McClure et al., 2004; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 
Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981).  
A number of reasons can explain the differences in findings, including the 
hypothetical rewards, the elicitation method, the subject pool, and the study setting. More 
generally, some recent experimental results on time preferences over monetary outcomes 
suggest that the evidence on hyperbolic discounting is not unanimous. For instance, a number 
of recent studies have failed to support the hypothesis of non-constant discounting, including 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), Laury et al. (2012), and Andersen et al. (2014). Furthermore, 
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a review of the literature by Andersen et al. (2014) notices that all evidence to date on non-
constant discounting with monetary outcomes refers either to hypothetical surveys, or to 
studies with no incentive-compatible rewards, or to lab experiments with student subjects. 
None of the studies included in the review by Andersen et al. (2014) elicits hypothetical 
health- and finance-related time preferences from doctors and patients in real clinical settings.  
Our study adds to this evidence and, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study to 
suggest that patients and doctors in real clinical settings may not exhibit any significant 
present bias when making decisions on healthcare treatments over time. Given that quasi-
hyperbolic discounting is associated to dynamic inconsistency, it is somehow reassuring to 
learn that, at least when it comes to healthcare decisions in real clinical settings, not only 
doctors but also patients exhibit time-consistent preferences. Similarly reassuring is the 
finding that there is no systematic difference in risk preferences between doctors and patients 
whey they make decisions over risky healthcare treatments. However, further evidence is 
needed to understand whether this is due to the specific healthcare domain, the clinical 
setting, the hypothetical nature of the decisions, or any other specific characteristics of our 
field study. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Preferences for risk and time are fundamental individual characteristics that have been 
found to be associated with numerous health and healthcare behaviours, including: heavy 
drinking (Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Bradford et al., 2014; Szrek et al., 2012), drink and 
driving (Sloan et al., 2014) smoking (Barsky et al., 1995; Bradford et al., 2014; Bradford, 
2010; Burks et al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 2011; Goto et al., 2009), BMI (Borghans and 
Golsteyn, 2006; Chabris et al., 2008; Ikeda et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2013; Weller et al., 
2008), poor nutritional quality (Galizzi and Miraldo, 2012); as well as overall self-assessed 
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health (Van Der Pol, 2011), the uptake of vaccinations, preventive care, and medical tests 
(Axon et al., 2009; Bradford, 2010; Bradford et al., 2010; Chapman and Coups, 1999; Picone 
et al., 2004) and adherence to treatments (Brandt and Dickinson, 2013; Chapman et al., 
2001). 
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to differences and similarities of risk and 
time preferences between doctors and their patients. These differences can potentially have a 
major impact on doctor-patient communication, healthcare decision-making, and treatment 
adherence. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first field experiment to examine 
differences in risk and time preferences between doctors and patients in real clinical settings. 
We have three main findings. First, there is a significant difference in time 
preferences across patients and their matched doctors, with doctors discounting future less 
heavily than patients. Second, we find no systematic difference in risk preferences in the 
healthcare context between patients and doctors: in our sample both patients and their 
matched doctors are mildly, but significantly, risk averse in the healthcare domain. Third, 
patients and doctors have significantly different risk preferences in the finance domain: while 
doctors are risk averse, patients are risk neutral. This raises the question whether the 
healthcare results were biased due to differences in the size of health gain. However, no 
relationship was found between risk preferences and self-assessed health.  
The findings have potential implications for health policy. In several healthcare 
contexts individuals are matched to their doctors and healthcare on characteristics such as 
gender and ethnicity (Cooper et al., 2003; Cooper-Patrick et al., 1999; Saha et al., 1999). A 
number of other interventions have been suggested to improve risk communication during the 
consultation with the aim of achieving better outcomes (Edwards et al., 2008; Fagerlin et al., 
2011). Our research contributes to this line of research suggesting that the doctor-patient 
matching and communication could be more systematically informed by a broader set of 
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characteristics, such as individual preferences for risk and time. As agents to their patients, 
doctors, for instance, should attempt to find out more about their patients’ risk and time 
preferences when recommending specific healthcare treatments. Time and risk preferences 
are difficult to observe but are known to be associated with a number of more observable 
characteristics such as age, gender and income.  One approach is therefore for the doctor to 
use these observable proxies of time and risk preferences to adjust their treatment 
recommendations.  Given the availability of short questions on self-reported time and risk 
attitudes, it may also be possible for the doctor to obtain proxy indicators of their patients’ 
preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011; Vischer et al., 2013).  Perhaps a more realistic scenario is 
to make doctors aware of potential differences in time and risk preferences between 
themselves and their patients and to recommend that they explicitly discuss the relative 
weights that patients place on the timing and the risk of treatments.  Shared decision making 
between doctors and patients has been found to associate with better health outcomes 
(Greenfield et al., 1985).  
Our findings on time preferences suggest that doctors, aware that patients are 
discounting the future more heavily, should recommend treatments which reflect the higher 
weight placed on shorter term benefits.  However, it has also been suggested that individuals 
may consider their heavy discounting of the future to be undesirable, and that they may wish 
to overcome their impatience (Becker and Mulligan, 1997). If this is the case, then this raises 
the question whether there is a role for the agent (doctor) to help the patients overcome their 
impatience for receiving the benefits from treatment.   
The study is, of course, not without limitations. The experiments were conducted from 
the perspective of the participants’ current health status. Future research should explore 
whether results are sensitive to the differences in the size of health gain across doctors and 
patients. Due to the ethics constraints related to approaching patients in hospital clinics, we 
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were unable to conduct experimental tests with real, incentive-compatible rewards in order to 
measure risk and time preferences in the healthcare domain. It is widely known that 
individual responses may change when real rewards are at stake (Andersen et al., 2014; 
Blackburn et al., 1994; Cummings et al., 1997, 1995). In particular, in the finance domain, 
hypothetical tests are known to elicit less risk averse preferences than incentive-compatible 
tests (Battalio et al., 1990; Holt and Laury, 2002). The design and implementation of 
incentive-compatible tests to measure risk and time preferences in the health domain is a 
challenging but promising area where more work is needed. 
Another aspect which deserves explicit investigation is looking at the interaction 
between risk and time preferences in health. For monetary outcomes, risk and time 
preferences have been found to closely correlate and interlink (Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997, 
1997; Anderhub et al., 2001; Andersen et al., 2008b; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Chesson 
and Viscusi, 2000; Coble and Lusk, 2010; Epstein and Zin, 1989a, 1989b; Frederick et al., 
2002; Kreps and Porteus, 1978, 1978; Laury et al., 2012; Noussair and Wu, 2006; Onay and 
Öncüler, 2007; Stevenson, 1992, 1992; Weber and Chapman, 2005). The experimental 
economics literature has in fact developed ‘structural estimation’ models that jointly estimate 
risk and time preferences (Andersen et al., 2014, 2008b). A similar avenue is beyond the 
scope of the present study, but it can be usefully explored by the next generation of incentive-
compatible tests for preferences in health. 
Furthermore, in our experiment doctors completed a questionnaire, which asked them 
about their own risk and time preferences, just like patients did. This is consistent with the 
fact that doctors’ own risk and time preferences have been shown to correlate with treatment 
decisions (Allison et al., 1998; Fiscella et al., 2000; Franks et al., 2000; Holtgrave et al., 
1991). Doctors, moreover, may have different risk and time preferences regarding their own 
health from when they prescribe risky healthcare treatments to their patients (Atanasov et al., 
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2013; Beisswanger et al., 2003; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2014, 2012). This is an 
intriguing question, and similar patterns have in fact been documented in other doctor-patient 
interaction contexts, such as the choice of healthcare treatments in a consultation (Ubel et al., 
2011). The question, however, is beyond the direct scope of the present study, and is left for 
further research.  
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Appendix A: Description of variables 
Variable Variable description 
Explanatory variables 
Individual characteristics for patients and doctors  
Age Age in years 
Female Female gender (0=no, 1=yes) 
Educ* 
Level of education (1=primary school…8=doctoral or post-graduate 
specialization degree)  
FinConstr 
Constrained by my financial state (1=living comfortably…4=find it very 
difficult) 
Married Married (0=no, 1=yes) 
Children Having children (0=no, 1=yes) 
SAH Self-assessed health (1= very good…5=very bad) 
Chronic * Presence of a chronic condition (0=no, 1=yes) 
Risk variables  
SwitchRiskHP 
Patients’ risk aversion in healthcare implied by switching point in the test 
(1=extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
SwitchRiskHD 
Doctors’ risk aversion in healthcare implied by switching point in the test (1= 
extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
SwitchRiskFP 
Patients’ risk aversion in finance implied by switching point in the test (1= 
extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
SwitchRiskFD 
Doctors’ risk aversion in finance implied by switching point in the test (1= 
extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
  
Time variables  
SwitchTimeHPBi 
Patients’ time preference in healthcare implied by switching point in block 
i=1…6 (1=least patient…6=most patient) 
SwitchTimeHDBi 
Doctors’ time preference in healthcare implied by switching point in block 
i=1…6 (1=least patient…6=most patient) 
SwitchTimeFPBi 
Patients’ time preference in finance implied by switching point in block i=1…6  
(1=least patient…6=most patient) 
SwitchTimeFDBi 
Doctors’ time preference in finance implied by switching point in block i=1…6 
(1=least patient…6=most patient) 
  
*Information obtained only for patients. In order to be consultants in outpatient clinics, all doctors 
must have at least one post-graduate medical specialization.  
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Appendix B: Structural estimations for the two subsamples of doctors and patients. 
 
Table 1. Estimated risk aversion parameters in healthcare under CRRA for patients and doctors. 
 Healthcare domain Financial domain 
  Patients  Doctors Patients  Doctors 
s  0.1211** 0.2084** -0.0135 0.3217*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0966) (0.0578) (0.1027) 
Μ 34.5443*** 19.6467** 71.8446*** 12.2540** 
 (8.5544) (8.5086) (20.7588) (5.7425) 
Observations 2700 603 2700 603 
Log pseudo LL -1422.77 -296.93 -1450.75 -305.97 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 
Table 2. Estimated discounting parameters in the healthcare domain under exponential, hyperbolic, 
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. 
 Healthcare domain Financial domain 
  
Exponentia
l Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic 
Exponentia
l Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic 
2a. Patients       
μ  0.0036*** 0.0042*** 0.0035*** 0.0044*** 0.0052*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
R 0.0215*** 0.0338*** 0.0233*** 0.0279*** 0.0465*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0078) (0.0033) 
B   1.0445***   0.8829*** 
   (0.0635)   (0.0548) 
Observations 7605 7605 7605 4255 4255 4255 
Adj R-Squared 0.5525 0.5535 0.5525 0.6290 0.6293 0.6298 
2b. Doctors       
μ  0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0036*** 0.0055*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
R 0.0065*** 0.0087** 0.0071*** 0.0082*** 0.0115*** 0.0077*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0015) 
B   1.0426***   0.9685*** 
   (0.1016)   (0.0788) 
Observations 1780 1780 1780 1405 1405 1405 
Adj R-Squared 0.3878 0.3883 0.3880 0.4313 0.4321 0.4315 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.. 
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Online Appendix 
 
A1. Experimental instructions 
 
 
Dear Madam/Sir 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a study asking your personal views on 
health and life in general. The survey consists of two parts. The first part takes place 
while waiting to see your doctor and takes 15 minutes to complete. The second part will 
be completed after you see your doctor and takes 5 minutes to answer. 
 
The study is conducted strictly for academic purposes and neither the Hospital nor the 
doctor have any involvement in it. All answers will remain completely anonymous and 
confidential.  
 
We appreciate your time and effort. 
 
Kind regards, 
The Research Team  
 
 
Q1.01 How is your health in general? Would you say it is… (please circle the appropriate 
box) 
 
Very 
Good 
Good Fair Bad Very bad (DA) 
 
 
Q1.02 Are you hampered in your daily activities in any way by any longstanding illness, or 
disability, infirmity or mental health problem? If yes, is that a lot or to some extent? (please 
circle the appropriate box) 
 
Yes, a lot Yes, to some 
extent 
No (DA) 
 
Q1.03 Do you smoke or did you ever smoke? (please circle the appropriate box) 
 
Smoke 
daily 
Smoke 
occasionally  
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
daily 
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
occasionally 
Never 
smoked 
(DA) 
 
 
Q1.04 If you smoke, how many cigarettes do you smoke on average a day?  
 (please indicate number of cigarettes in the box) 
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Q1.05 How many units of alcohol do you drink a week? (a unit of alcohol corresponds to a 
small glass of wine, a medium glass of beer or a shot of 
spirits). 
 
 
Q1.06 How many hours a week do you usually spend in moderate physical activities? 
Consider as a physical activity any moderate physical activity lasting for at least 40 
consecutive minutes (such as walking, cleaning, gardening). 
 
Q1.07 How many hours a week do you usually spend in vigorous physical activities? 
Consider as a physical activity any vigorous physical activity lasting for at least 40 
consecutive minutes (such as cycling, jogging, gym, step aerobics, swimming, football 
etc). 
 
 
Q1.08 Please indicate whether each of the following statements applies or not to your 
behaviour: (please tick the appropriate column) 
 Totally 
agree Agree 
It 
depends 
Do not 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
a. I never make up a decision I will 
regret in the future 
     
b. I can never identify which 
choice is better for me 
     
c. Life is like a lottery. Being 
happy is just a matter of chance 
     
d. My forecasts are always correct 
     
 
 
Q1.09 Provide a percentage to answer each of the following questions: 
 Percentage 
(%) 
a. What percentage of people of your age have a better job than you,  
because they have better skills than you 
 
b. What percentage of your neighbours will better succeed in life when 
compared to you because of their better qualities with respect to yours 
 
c. What percentage of people of your age will have higher cash 
payments than yours for their better performance in their jobs?  
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Q1.10 How I see myself (tick the appropriate column): 
 Strongly 
agree  
Agree 
Not 
sure 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
a. I am a daring person who generally 
takes risks.      
b. I take initiative, pursuing opportunities 
even when they involve some risk.      
c. I am a cautious person who generally 
avoids risks. 
     
d. I always play it safe even if it means 
occasionally losing out on a good 
opportunity. 
     
 
 
Q1.11. Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative 
hypothetical lotteries, choose the lottery that you prefer between option A and option B. 
Lottery A will give you either 200 € or 160 € with some probabilities which change gradually 
in each row. Lottery B will give you either 385 € or 10 € again with some probabilities that 
change gradually in each row.  
 
For instance, in row 1, lottery A gives you 200 € with probability 10% and 160 € with 
probability 90%, while lottery B gives you 385 € with probability 10% and 10 € with 
probability 90%. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either 
A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal 
choices we are interested in.  
 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € p € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
 
Q1.12 Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative 
hypothetical options, choose the one that you prefer between option A and option B. Both 
options give you certain monetary payments. Payments in option A will be given at a later 
date, and payments in option B are given today. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, 
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by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or 
wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we are interested in. 
 
ID Option A                  Option B Your choice 
1 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 60 € today A B 
2 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 120 € today A B 
3 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 180 € today A B 
4 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 240 € today A B 
5 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
     
6 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 60 € today A B 
7 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 120 € today A B 
8 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 180 € today A B 
9 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 240 € today A B 
10 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
     
11 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 60 € today A B 
12 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 120 € today A B 
13 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 180 € today A B 
14 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 240 € today A B 
15 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
     
16 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 150 € today A B 
17 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
18 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 450 € today A B 
19 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 600 € today A B 
20 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 750 € today A B 
     
21 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 150 € today A B 
22 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
23 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 450 € today A B 
24 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 600 € today A B 
25 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 750 € today A B 
     
26 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 150 € today A B 
27 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
28 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 450 € today A B 
29 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 600 € today A B 
30 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 750 € today A B 
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Q1.13. Please think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you need to choose 
between two medical treatments, A and B. Each treatment has two possible outcomes in 
terms of how long the effect will last. You know the probabilities with which this will 
happen. Irrespective of which treatment you choose, for as long as their effect lasts you are in 
full health. When the effect of the treatment is gone, you go back to your initial state of 
health, i.e. the state you where before you started the treatment that is the same 
regardless of the treatment you chose, and no further treatment will be allowed. 
 
For instance, in row 1, treatment A will give you 200 days of full health with probability 10% 
or 160 days in full health with probability 90%. Treatment B gives you 385 days of full 
health with probability 10% or 10 days in full health with probability 90%.  
 
Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the 
last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we 
are interested in. 
 
 Treatment A Treatment B Your 
Choice 
 P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in 
full health 
  
1 10% 200 days 90% 160 days  10% 385 days  90% 10 days A B 
2 20% 200 days  80% 160 days  20% 385 days  80% 10 days A B 
3 30% 200 days  70% 160 days  30% 385 days  70% 10 days A B 
4 40% 200 days  60% 160 days  40% 385 days  60% 10 days A B 
5 50% 200 days  50% 160 days  50% 385 days  50% 10 days A B 
6 60% 200 days  40% 160 days  60% 385 days  40% 10 days A B 
7 70% 200 days  30% 160 days  70% 385 days  30% 10 days A B 
8 80% 200 days  20% 160 days  80% 385 days  20% 10 days A B 
9 90% 200 days  10% 160 days  90% 385 days  10% 10 days A B 
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Q1.14 Think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you currently suffer from a 
specific medical condition that has an impact on your health. You can choose between two 
medical treatments, A and B. Treatment A is available at a later date whilst treatment B is 
available today. When you start the treatment regardless of the starting date, its effects will 
last for the days stated in each option. For example, in the first choice, treatment A will give 
you full health for 360 days starting in one week’s time, and treatment B will give you 60 
days of full health starting from today. At the end of the treatment you go back to your 
initial state, i.e. the state you were before you started the treatment, and no further 
treatment will be allowed. 
 
There are no other differences between the two treatments. Please, for each of the following 
rows, choose the option that you prefer between treatment A and treatment B. Please, make 
your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. 
Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we are interested 
in. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your 
choice 
1  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
2  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
3  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
180 days in full health  starting today A B 
4  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
5  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
6  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
7  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
8  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
9  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 month 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
10  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
11  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
12  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
13  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
14  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
15  360 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
16  900 days in full health starting 150 days in full health starting today A B 
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in 1 week 
17  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
18  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
19  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
20  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
21  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
22  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
23  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
450 days in full starting health today A B 
24  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
25  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
26  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
27  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
28  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
29  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
30  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
 
 
For statistical purposes we would like to ask you the following... 
 
Q1.15 What is your date of birth? 
 
 
Q1.16 What is you sex? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Male Female 
 
Q1.17 What is the highest level of education you have completed?   (please circle) 
a. Never been to school 
b. Primary School 
c. Junior High School 
d. High School 
e. Technical School 
f. Technical College 
g. University 
h. Post-Graduate studies 
Day Month Year 
      
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 47 
i. (DA) 
 
Q1.18 What is your marital status? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Single Married Divorced Widow (DA) 
 
Q1.19 Do you have children? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Yes No (DA) 
 
Q1.20 Are you currently living alone? (please circle as appropriate) 
Yes No (DA) 
 
 
Q1.21 Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays?  
Living comfortably on present income  
  Coping on present income  
Find it difficult on present income  
Finding it very difficult on present income  
(DK)/(DA)  
 
Q1.22 Thinking of your monthly personal income, is this: 
 
Less than 600 
Euros 
601- 1000 
Euros 
1001-1500 
Euros 
1501-2000 
Euros 
2000-3000 Euros More than 3000 
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A.2: Risk and time preferences tests in the monetary domain 
 
 
Table 8. The Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test to measure risk preferences in the finance domain. 
 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € P € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
 
 
Table 9. The Tanaka et al (2010) test to measure time preferences in the finance domain. 
ID Option A                  Option B Your choice 
7.1 360 € in 1 week 60 € today A B 
7.2 360 € in 1 week 120 € today A B 
7.3 360 € in 1 week 180 € today A B 
7.4 360 € in 1 week 240 € today A B 
7.5 360 € in 1 week 300 € today A B 
8.1 360 € in 1 month 60 € today A B 
8.2 360 € in 1 month 120 € today A B 
8.3 360 € in 1 month 180 € today A B 
8.4 360 € in 1 month 240 € today A B 
8.5 360 € in 1 month 300 € today A B 
9.1 360 € in 3 months 60 € today A B 
9.2 360 € in 3 months 120 € today A B 
9.3 360 € in 3 months 180 € today A B 
9.4 360 € in 3 months 240 € today A B 
9.5 360 € in 3 months 300 € today A B 
10.1 900 € in 1 week 150 € today A B 
10.2 900 € in 1 week 300 € today A B 
10.3 900 € in 1 week 450 € today A B 
10.4 900 € in 1 week 600 € today A B 
10.5 900 € in 1 week 750 € today A B 
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11.1 900 € in 1 month 150 € today A B 
11.2 900 € in 1 month 300 € today A B 
11.3 900 € in 1 month 450 € today A B 
11.4 900 € in 1 month 600 € today A B 
11.5 900 € in 1 month 750 € today A B 
12.1 900 € in 3 months 150 € today A B 
12.2 900 € in 3 months 300 € today A B 
12.3 900 € in 3 months 450 € today A B 
12.4 900 € in 3 months 600 € today A B 
12.5 900 € in 3 months 750 € today A B 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
